Our brains have been formed by evolution to optimize action selection and execution in order to promote our survival. This requires the processing of incoming sensory information, weighing its contextual relevance based on both the external environment and our internal state, deciding between alternative actions, selecting the appropriate movement, and evaluating the executed behavior for its result. Often, these processes rely on internal variables that are not directly observable to an experimenter, such as motivation, homeostasis, and decision history. A complete, ecologically valid approach for studying the neural processes underlying cognitive control necessitates taking these variables into account.
hypotheses on how a brain may represent and encode different processes relevant to cognitive control. For example, performance monitoring requires not only monitoring the outcome of an action, but also a representation of the goal of the action, local trial history, and strategy. This can be formally expressed in models that predict the influence of prior information w on neural activity y on a given trial via the unobserved but modelled hidden process. Thus, rather than simply correlating neural activity, y, with the presence or absence of a certain stimulus, w, (Fig. 23.1a), we aim to estimate the value of the hidden variables mediating this relationship, z, (Fig. 
23.1b).
The basic procedure for model-based analyses is then as follows ( Fig. 23 .1c, see ref. 32 for an in-depth discussion). First, one has to create a model that can emulate the task in the way hypothesized. This model should describe the transformation of stimuli to the observable behavioral responses and should contain the not directly observable, variables that affect this transformation (indicated by z in Fig. 20 .1b). One advantage of this approach is that not just one candidate model, but any set of candidate models can be created and compared by fitting the output of these models to the behavioural or neural data from each participant.
Often, models have some free parameters, e.g., the learning rate in simple reinforcement learning models, which need to be fitted to the individual dataset before one assesses the model fit. These free parameters can, for instance, reflect individual differences between participants. However, one should be cautious not to employ too many free parameters, since this reduces the specificity of the model. However, a critical advantage of using formal models is that they permit model comparison, using model comparison techniques 7, 50 that can account for the number of parameters in a model. As formal models encapsulate hypotheses about how different cognitive processes cause the observed activity (or behavior), one can now test whether alternative models (hypotheses) provide more parsimonious explanations of the observed data. A model perfectly emulating the hidden states, z, should perfectly predict the observed data, y, and the evidence of a model, given this data, can be used to assess its usefulness. This is quite different from merely assessing the goodness of fit of one model to the data, as in classical statistics. Moreover, it is the formal structure of such models which is appealing: this makes it easy to modify or expand models, but also provides a high level of transparency about the assumptions being made. Because one can, in principle, account for different degrees of model complexity, models of varying structure and complexity can be directly compared. Increasing the complexity of a model lead to over-fitting, and one can assess whether increasing the complexity of a model provides a more parsimonious explanation of the observed data. But perhaps more importantly, one can in principle compare models which may be very different in their spirit and architecture, and may embellish very different hypothesis on how the data was caused. This may be of particular relevance for studies of cognitive control, where often several competing hypothesis (and therefore) exist about the processes involved (e.g. working memory, attention).
Model-based approaches: the use of information theory
One essential requirement for quick and successful action selection is having a representation of the previous history and the current state of the environment in order to make predictions about forthcoming events. For example, attention may be allocated to events that are unexpected in the current context, i.e. 'surprising' events. Fewer resources might therefore be required for the processing of predicted events, which in turn may free resources to respond to unexpected surprising events. As such, it has been suggested that the cortex may have evolved to predict regularities in the environment, in which surprising events play a central role 27, 38 . This might allow for flexible and efficient action selection in the face of an uncertain environment.
Indeed, a mechanism of prediction and detection of violations of these has been suggested as a principle computational mechanism throughout the cortex 16 .
First evidence that observers responses depend on their estimation of the probability of an event occurring comes from the work of Hick 23 and Hyman 26 . These authors showed a linear map from the number of options in a forced choice task to observed reaction time. This
suggests that a statistical model could be used to form hypotheses as to how humans encode uncertainty to make informed decisions and select their actions accordingly. The probabilities of events can be viewed as representing "causes" in that they are used to generate sequences of these events to which an observer has to react. As suggested by Hick 23 and Hyman 26 , an observer may track the statistics of these causes over time. These statistics can therefore form the basis of a computational model whose purpose is to explain observed responses of humans to uncertainty. One way to achieve this is to use information theory 40 , which provides explanatory variables that are a function of the observers estimate of the probability distribution responsible for generating samples 3, 22, 31, 43 .
For example, given t samples of x (which we denote by } ,...,
, and where x is the number of event types), the objective is to estimate the probability of the k th event occurring, k ρ , and a measure of uncertainty over it. A Bayesian approach to these data is to specify a prior over ρ and couple these parameters to the data via an observation model, the so-called likelihood. The posterior distribution over ρ is given by Bayes Rule 4 , i.e. proportional to the product of the likelihood and prior.
are the likelihood, prior and posterior respectively.
The likelihood is a Multinomial distribution and we assume a Dirichlet density for the prior. This being a conjugate prior means that the posterior density is also a Dirichlet, and at the t th trial is
Where k t is the number of counts of the k th event type and the posterior is updated sequentially with each new sample presented to a subject,
is a set of parameters, which can be thought of as 'virtual' counts seen before observing data. This series of incrementally updated posterior densities is our model of what an observer is encoding when observing a sequence of events to which he has to responds. These can then be used to explain behavioral or neuronal responses, such as reaction time, corticospinal excitability, or fMRI data.
Such a model can be used to predict responses by taking a function of the posterior density, for example, information theoretic (IT) indices, such as the 'trial-by-trial' surprise or entropy, which are the negative log of the probability of the k th event type,
, and the expectation of
, respectively ( Fig. 23.2a) . Intuitively, the lower the probability of the k th event occurring, the more surprised an individual is when it occurs and equally uncertain events are, on average, more uncertain than extremes. For example, there is greater uncertainty in a fair coin compared to one that is biased. Consequently, selecting an appropriate action in response to uncertain and/or more surprising events may require more time. Such a simple computational model can therefore be used to capture the between-trial structure in a sequence of events (stimuli) and corresponding changes in neural or behavioral data.
In the following, we present three studies that use such an information theoretic approach to investigate whether the brain might use a predictive strategy in action selection in simple choice-RT tasks, whether it can be used to explain neural responses related to learning of contextual uncertainty, and whether one can apply this approach to predict electrophysiological response related to contextual updating.
Motor preparation and contextual uncertainty
It is well-established that prior information influences motor preparation. For example, in monkeys, modulating response probability modulates reaction times and preparatory activity for eye 14 and arm movements 28 . In humans, preparatory activity is modulated by the probability of responding at the end of trial 46 , and by the probability that a movement will have to be executed at a given time 47, 49 . These results suggest that activity in the motor system can reflect the uncertainty conveyed by visual information required for successful action selection.
However, inferring motor preparation as the underlying process for this reaction time effect was previously based on the average difference between the a priori known probabilities, thereby ignoring to a large degree the dynamical changes in the context and prior information that need to be learned in order to facilitate action selection. Using quantitative indices of uncertainty enables the analysis of such dynamic between-trial changes, and their influence on preparatory activity. In humans, one can investigate the dynamic changes in preparatory activity, and their correspondence with internal state variables such as uncertainty, using transcranial magnetic stimulation. This technique assesses changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during, for example, an instructed delay period. Prior work has established the use of this approach for measuring the physiological signature of motor preparation in human motor cortex 30, 48 .
In a first study investigating whether the predictive information theoretic models provided a good index of CSE during choice-RT tasks, Bestmann and colleagues 3 measured CSE during a probabilistic motor preparation task. In the instructed delay task, an instruction cue provides information about the forthcoming movement that participants had to make upon presentation of a subsequent imperative cue presented about one second later. However, in different blocks of trials, the instruction cue predicted the identity of the imperative cue only with 85%, 70%, or 55% validity, respectively. In other words, in different block there were different degrees of uncertainty about the required action, given the instruction cue. These regularities were unknown to the participants and thus had to be learned in each block. As expected, behavioral data showed that participants reacted faster in trials in which the instruction cue was more reliable, yet this observation does not account for the dynamic process through which participants may have learned these underlying regularities.
The authors then quantified the contextual uncertainty within each block on a trial-bytrial basis using the formulas described above to ask whether these quantities might predict subject's responses and their preparatory state prior to these (as measured through CSE). RTs and muscle-specific CSE changes were indeed influenced by both entropy and surprise: High uncertainty (high entropy) about the upcoming imperative cue was associated with decreases in CSE during the preparatory period. Moreover, a surprising imperative cue on the preceding trial resulted in a similar decrease in CSE. Thus, delay-period CSE, which provides an index of the preparatory state of a subject was lower when preparatory cues resolved less uncertainty (entropy), and when surprise in the preceding trigger cues was large 3 . Similar results were seen in the reaction time data. Bayesian model comparison furthermore showed that there was more evidence supporting this information theoretic model, given the RT and the CSE data, compared to a small group of alternative models that did not, or not fully, account for the contextual uncertainty inherent in the sequence of trials. Based on these results, the authors concluded that human motor cortex is dynamically biased according to (inferred) contextual probabilities inherent in visual events, which are represented dynamically in the brain.
The encoding of entropy and surprise in the human brain
The above study showed that CSE was influenced by both entropy and surprise. However, the use of single-pulse TMS precludes inferences about brain regions outside primary motor cortex that may be involved in representing the stimulus environment, compute parameters such as surprise and entropy, and update the brain's model of the environment. This issue is better addressed with whole-brain functional MRI, which allows for identifying neural activity changes related to contextual uncertainty. In a recent study by Strange and colleagues 43 , participants who performed a simple choice-RT task, in which four stimuli were matched to four responses and presented at different frequencies in different blocks (see Fig. 23 .2a). Therefore, some stimuli were presented more often than others, thus decreasing entropy, while surprise associated with more infrequent stimuli increased. In other blocks, the probability of occurrence was similar for each of the stimuli. In these cases, entropy was high whereas the surprise associated to each stimulus remained relatively low. Inferring these relative probabilities of occurrence may allow for preparing for the appropriate response in advance of a stimulus.
As in the study by Bestmann and colleagues 3 , a significant part of the variance in trialby-trial fluctuations in reaction time was explained by entropy and surprise 43 . The authors then tested for neural activity explained by either entropy of surprise as a parametric modulation of stimulus occurrence. Activity in the hippocampus, although not showing a significant mean response to stimulus presentation, was modulated by entropy ( Fig. 23.2b) . Greater entropy,
i.e., more random stimulus occurrence, was associated with more hippocampal activity. Thus, although a simple main effect of task (stimulus presentation versus rest) would suggest that the hippocampus is not involved in this task, a model-based approach shows that the hippocampus may encode the expectation of an event, before it occurs. In contrast, surprise was associated with activity in a network including bilateral parietal, premotor, inferior frontal, and thalamic regions ( Fig. 23.2c) . These results show the allocation of neural resources to surprising, with the reverse contrast showing that less processing is required when events can be predicted.
Neural signatures of contextual updating
It has previously been suggested that a number of salient neural phenomena, such as the P300, the ERN, and the MMN, are representations of violation of prediction. Either in visual perception 44 , auditory perception 19 , or reward-based learning 24 , prediction errors or related processes such as surprise seem indeed to account for much of the variance in neural respones 16, 17 . The P300 in particular has been described as a component of the event-related brain potential that indexes how surprising a stimulus is according to the brain's internal model of the environment, or the updating of the brain's model in light of novel evidence 13 . A prominent recent theory suggests that the P300 reflects the response of the locus coeruleusnorepinephrine system to the outcome of internal decision making processes and the consequent effects of noradrenergic potentiation of information processing 34 (see Chapter 12, this volume).
One prediction then is that the P300 in a probabilistic choice-RT task can be described as a reflection of the trial-by-trial surprise conveyed by visual events 31 . Mars and colleagues asked participants to perform a simple choice-RT task in which they responded to the presentation of one of four visual stimuli that were mapped onto four different actions (button presses). During each block of 60 trials the probability of occurrence of each stimulus varied. Thus, participants had to learn about this underlying structure in order to respond as fast as possible to these events. Again, entropy and surprise were calculated for an ideal Bayesian learner. Following previous accounts on the P300 component, the authors hypothesised that surprise would best predict the trial-to-trial variations in the amplitude of the P300 component.
The authors first replicated previous work showing that a larger P300 is associated with less frequent stimuli. However, the novel question was whether the dynamic changes in surprise would capture how this difference in P300 response to the stimuli with different probabilities evolved. One central finding was that surprise captured the well-known behavior of the P300, such as that as an infrequent stimuli is presented twice in succession, the P300 to the second presentation is smaller 41 . Indeed, the P300 has traditionally been associated with 'context-updating', the updating of the observer's mental schema for future information processing 12, 13 (see Chapter 12, this volume for a discussion). Mars and colleagues showed that the surprise model indeed provided the best explanation of trial-by-trial change in P300
amplitude.
An important issue not addressed by this study was what kind of influence the surprise had on subsequent information processing. According to most models of the P300, and indeed most predictive coding models, the surprising stimulus or prediction error will affect the internal model of the environment. This issue was addressed in a recent study by Den Ouden and colleagues, in which the authors asked participants to perform an associative learning task while their brain activity was probed using fMRI 11 . Participants were required to classify a visual stimulus as either a house or a face. Auditory cues predicted the type of visual stimulus with a degree of validity that changed over time. Participants' behavior was modelled by a Bayesian learner that accounts for trial-by-trial updates of probability estimates 2 . Prediction errors were found in response to faces and houses in the fusiform face area (FFA) and the parahippocampal place area (PPA), respectively. Stimulus-independent prediction errors were found in the premotor cortex and the putamen. Importantly, prediction error responses in the putamen modulated the strength of connections from FFA and PPA to the premotor cortex, illustrating the role of prediction errors in modulating subsequent information processing in relation to the selection of forthcoming actions. The influence of changes in connection strength was assessed with dynamic causal modelling (DCM). This technique uses biophysical modeling to generate predictions about the causal effects that generated observed neural data. Its aim is to determine which of several pre-specified anatomical models best fits the data, i.e. explain regional BOLD responses in terms of inter-regional connectivity and its experimentally induced modulation. DCM calculates the statistical likelihood that an evoked response is driven by the flow of information from another, directly or indirectly connected brain region. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a reasonably realistic neural model such that the predicted regional BOLD signals, which result from converting the modeled neural dynamics into hemodynamic responses, correspond as closely as possible to the observed BOLD signals. DCM has been instrumental in providing new insight into the organization of brain systems [42] [43] [44] including action selection 45 and perceptual inference and associative learning 19, 46 . The study by
Den Ouden et al demonstrates the mutual benefits of these two model-based approaches. In combination, they allow for asking topical questions about effective connectivity changes and how these are influenced by computational processes that the brain needs to encode, such as prediction error.
Model-based approaches to cognitive control
The above example studies illustrate how a model-based approach, in this case employing Bayesian Model Selection maps. These replace the classical approach to fMRI because competing models can now be compared, at each voxel, by measuring the model evidence for each model, given data (i.e., each voxel) 37 . One critical advantage over the use of F-contrasts is that any number of models can in principle be compared, which are not restricted to be linear.
Thus, BMS can address questions about different computational models and their functional representation, including non-nested designs that speak to addressing questions about the best model, given brain responses 10, 32, 36 . The combination of computational models together with the use of BMS can therefore distinguish the representation of different computational models of, for example, value updating 33, 51 , reinforcement learning 21 , or perceptual decision making 15 , and we expect this to be an important direction for future studies on cognitive control.
Outstanding questions
• Previous model-based studies on cognitive control have largely focused on one specific aspect required for successful interaction with the world. Examples include the information theoretic models presented here to quantify probabilistic relationships among visual events in the context of action selection, or studies that employ models of prediction error in the context of reward processing and reward-based learning. In many cases, many processes (and models) are represented in the brain at the same time, including other important processes such as attention. Future work on cognitive control will require models that incorporate these different cognitive processes that often occur in parallel.
• What are the time-courses over which our brain integrates past information to predict future events? The fact that we need to forget distant events appeals to intuition, but little work has been done on how distant information is discarded or weighted to generate predictions about future events.
• Model-based approaches have largely focussed on functional data? To which extend is the degree with which these models can predict individual behaviour paralleled by structural markers? show situation for highly predictable environment, right hand panels for a poorly predictable environment. Top row shows occurrence of each of four stimuli during a block of 100 trials. It can be seen that in the highly predictable environment, the first stimulus occurs on most trials, whereas in the poorly predictable environment all stimuli are equiprobable over the course of the block. In the highly predictable environment entropy diminishes over time, but stimuli occurring with a small probability will be surprising. 
